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Abstract
■ Previous studies have argued that faces and other objects are
encoded in terms of their deviation from a class prototype or
norm. This prototype is associated with a smaller neural popula-
tion response compared with nonprototype objects. However, it
is still unclear (1) whether a norm-based representation can
emerge for unfamiliar or novel object classes through visual ex-
perience at the time scale of an experiment and (2) whether
the results from previous studies are caused by the prototypicality
of a stimulus, by the physical properties of individual stimuli in-
dependent from the stimulus distribution, and/or by the trial-to-
trial adaptation. Here we show with a combined behavioral and
event-related fMRI study in humans that a short amount of visual
experience with exemplars from novel object classes determines
which stimulus is represented as the norm. Prototypicality effects
were observed at the behavioral level by behavioral asymmetries
during a stimulus comparison task. The fMRI data revealed that
class exemplars closest to the prototypes—the perceived average
of each class—were associated with a smaller response in the
anterior part of the visual object-selective cortex compared with
other class exemplars. By dissociating between the physical char-
acteristics and the prototypicality status of the stimuli and by con-
trolling for trial-to-trial adaptation, we can firmly conclude for the
first time that high-level visual areas represent the identity of ex-
emplars using a dynamic, norm-based encoding principle. ■
INTRODUCTION
Primates are able to recognize objects at various levels,
often referred to as superordinate-level classification (e.g.,
tools vs. animals), basic-level categorization (e.g., mon-
key vs. dog), and subordinate-level identification (e.g., “is
this my dog?”) (Logothetis & Sheinberg, 1996; Nosofsky,
1986; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976).
Subordinate-level identification is very well developed in
primates, with face recognition being a primary example,
but the underlying neural representations are not com-
pletely understood. Here we studied the role of visual ex-
perience for the emergence of a specific coding scheme
for representing the differences among exemplars of vi-
sually homogeneous (basic-level) categories.
Recently, it has been proposed that adaptive coding
mechanisms, which are widely used to code simple low-
level sensory properties, also underlie the high-level cod-
ing of face identity (Rhodes & Jeffery, 2006). Specifically,
they propose that “facial identity is coded by pairs of neural
populations that are adaptively tuned to above-average and
below-average values, respectively, of each dimension in
face-space (see Figure 1). The values of each face on each
dimension of face-space are signaled by the relative activa-
tion of the paired populations, with equal activation signal-
ing average values” (p. 2984).
An adaptive coding mechanism (1) is based on neurons
that dynamically adapt to the prevailing (average or proto-
typical) stimulus values or statistics in the environment,
(2) is neurally and computationally efficient, and (3) alerts
the system by focussing resources on uncommon or non-
average inputs (Barlow, 1990). Thus, discriminating be-
tween visually similar faces is possible if the average face,
which lies at the center of a neural face space, functions as
a norm or prototype against which individuating (identity)
information is coded (Rhodes & Jeffery, 2006; Leopold,
OʼToole, Vetter, & Blanz, 2001).
Evidence for such norm-based representations has been
provided using behavioral paradigms measuring similar-
ity ratings, aftereffects, perceptual classifications, same–
different decisions, and so forth (Anderson & Wilson, 2005;
Leopold, Rhodes, Muller, & Jeffery, 2005; Op de Beeck,
Wagemans, & Vogels, 2003a; Leopold et al., 2001; Lee,
Byatt, & Rhodes, 2000; Suzuki & Cavanagh, 1998; Nosofsky,
1991; Rhodes, Brennan, & Carey, 1987), human fMRI studies
(Loffler, Yourganov, Wilkinson, & Wilson, 2005), and extra-
cellular recordings in monkeys (De Baene, Premereur, &
Vogels, 2007; Leopold, Bondar, & Giese, 2006; Kayaert,
Biederman, Op de Beeck, & Vogels, 2005). Individual neu-
rons represent how, and how much, an exemplar of a class
deviates from the class norm or prototype. The population
response, that is, the response averaged across all involved
neurons, also represents the deviation from the class proto-
type, which is associated with the lowest population re-
sponse. Importantly, several of these studies used otherUniversity of Leuven (K.U. Leuven), Belgium
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shape stimuli than faces (De Baene et al., 2007; Kayaert,
Biederman, Op de Beeck, et al., 2005; Op de Beeck et al.,
2003a), suggesting that norm-based encoding might be a
general principle by which different exemplars from a basic
level category are represented.
However, none of these reports has explicitly investigated
how such a norm-based encoding scheme is induced and
whether there is an effect of visual experience. Although
adaptive tuning to stimulus statistics, hence a strong effect
of visual experience is an inherent feature of the adaptive
coding model as described earlier, the aforementioned ex-
periments have typically studied norm-based coding as a
given and have taken for granted that the “norm” is a fixed
stimulus.
A simple observation tells us that this cannot be true.
Tsao and Freiwald (2006) compared the prototypes used
in different studies on face space (Rhodes & Jeffery, 2006;
Anderson & Wilson, 2005; Leopold et al., 2001) and con-
cluded that these prototypes have a very different appear-
ance: “The ‘average face’ used in three studies of the face
adaptation illusion look quite different from each other…,
yet all three studies argue for a special role for their aver-
age face” (p. 393). This suggests that the stimulus that is
seen as the norm or prototype is not fixed, even not for
very well known objects such as faces for which the proto-
type could have been firmly established throughout devel-
opment or even be innate. It should thus be possible to
reverse the role of stimuli as being a prototype or not by
changing the distribution of stimuli, maybe already during
the course of an experiment. This is what we have done in
the present study.
At the neural level, we used the previously described
differences in neural population response (Loffler et al.,
2005) as an index for whether a stimulus is processed as
a prototype or not. At the behavioral level, we analyzed
the asymmetry of similarity judgments (Tversky, 1977).
Several previous studies have proposed that asymmetries
in a successive stimulus comparison task can be used as
an index that some stimuli have a special status in the
representation of stimulus differences (Op de Beeck
et al., 2003a; Nosofsky, 1991). The underlying notion is
the concept of stimulus bias, that is, a bias to perceive or
remember certain stimuli. For example, “natural proto-
types” defined by Rosch (1973) as elements around which
many perceptual categories found in the natural world are
organized have been described as a clear-cut example of
stimulus bias (see Nosofsky, 1991, p. 114–115), and asym-
metric similarity judgments related to the prototypicality of
shapes have been described before (Op de Beeck et al.,
2003a). The direction of the empirically observed and the-
oretically predicted (Nosofsky, 1991) asymmetry is as fol-
lows: If in a trial the special (or biased) stimulus comes
first, then it will be perceived as more different from the
other stimulus in the trial than when the special stimu-
lus comes second. If the two stimuli in a trial have the
same status (e.g., no prototypes), then no asymmetry is
expected.
Once we consider the possibility that these prototype
effects are induced by visual experience, we have to con-
sider at which time scale these effects play. A longer term,
adaptive effect of norm-based coding that builds up across
many trials would not decrease the value of the concept
of norm-based coding and the way it is measured in neuro-
physiological studies. However, some previous, as yet un-
published, reports have criticized, even dismissed, the
neurophysiological results on norm-based coding for
faces (Leopold et al., 2006; Loffler et al., 2005) because they
did not take into account the possible effects of very short-
term trial-to-trial adaptation (N. Davidenko, D. Remus, and
K. Grill-Spector, Society for Neuroscience Abstracts, 19.5,
2008). The criticism is that very short-term effects, such
as adaptation from the immediately preceding trial, were
not ruled out. Since at this moment the only published
fMRI study on norm-based encoding (Loffler et al., 2005)
used a block design, this alternative explanation in terms
of short-term adaptation cannot be ruled out yet.
Here, we wanted to establish (i) that a norm-based cod-
ing can be so strongly modulated by visual experience
during the course of an experiment so that the physical
stimulus properties or identity can be dissociated from
the stimulusʼ status as a prototype, even more, that the
status as prototype or extreme class example can be re-
versed between groups of participants simply by the type
of visual experience, and (ii) that these effects are not due
to short-term trial-to-trial adaptation and build up gradually
across intervening trials.
Figure 1. Adaptive coding model (adapted from Rhodes & Jeffery,
2006; see also Tsao & Freiwald, 2006). For each dimension x used
to discriminate exemplars, there are two populations of neurons.
Pool 1 (dotted curve) codes below-average values, and Pool 2
(black curve) codes above-average values. Average values are coded
implicitly by equal activation of the two populations (vertical line).
Exposure to an exemplar with a high value on dimension x will
adapt Pool 2 neurons (vertical arrows and dashed curve) and shift
the perceived average (dashed vertical line) toward the adapting
exemplar (horizontal arrow).
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Here, we present the first study that dissociates between
the prototypicality status of an exemplar and the other pre-
existing biases associated with the shape of this exemplar.
Stimuli were well-controlled geometric shapes that were lo-
cated at equal physical and perceived distances in a (one-
dimensional) shape space. The distribution of exemplars
was changed across subjects so that the class prototype
in one subject was a nonprototype in another subject. In
other words, the prototypicality status of an exemplar
could only be inferred by taken into consideration its simi-
larity to the particular exemplars that were shown.
Furthermore, we designed the fMRI experiment in such a
way to avoid adaptation between successive trials as much
as possible. In contrast to all previous fMRI studies on this
topic, we used an event-related design with one image per
trial, and we had a relatively long time interval between suc-
cessive images. We also verified empirically that no adapta-
tion occurred specifically between successive images.
Biasingeffects ofprototypicalitywereevident at thebehav-
ioral level from behavioral asymmetries during a tempo-
ral stimulus comparison task with direct similarity ratings.
Furthermore, the class exemplar closest to the perceived
average was associated with a smaller fMRI BOLD response
compared with nonprototypical class exemplars in object-
selective visual cortex, more specifically in the fusiform
gyrus. This finding supports the hypothesis that visual
exposure to the distribution of novel object exemplars
can strongly modulate and even reverse between groups
of participants, which stimulus is represented as the class
prototype in a higher level region of the cortical object vi-
sion pathway.
METHODS
Subjects
Thirty subjects (15 men, aged 20–34 years) participated in
this experiment. Written informed consent was obtained
from each subject, and they were paid A60 for their par-
ticipation (3 hours in total). All subjects participated in
the two phases of the experiment (behavior and fMRI).
Ethics Statement
All procedures were approved by the relevant ethical boards,
that is, the ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology
and Educational Sciences (K.U. Leuven) and the committee
for medical ethics of the University Hospital. Written in-
formed consent was obtained from each participant.
Stimuli
Stimuli were constructed using a parameterization in terms
of radial frequency components as described before (Op
deBeeck,Wagemans,&Vogels, 2001, 2003b). The total stim-
ulus set included four classes of seven object exemplars.
The seven exemplars from each class were located on a
(one-dimensional) line in an originally two-dimensional
shape space with dimensions representing the amplitude
of two radial frequency components. The stimuli were gray
surfaces presented on a black background (256 × 256 pix-
els). For 14 participants, stimuli were presented as uniform
gray surfaces/silhouettes on a black background. For the
other 16 participants, shapes were rendered with a grassfire
texture on the basis of the shape skeleton (Blum, 1973),
giving the stimuli the appearance of three-dimensional
objects (see Figure 2A). Previous studies of object-selective
regions in humans and monkeys have found selective
responses with shaded three-dimensional objects (Op
de Beeck, Torfs, & Wagemans, 2008) as well as with two-
dimensional silhouettes or contours (Drucker & Aguirre,
2009; Kayaert, Biederman, & Vogels, 2005; Op de Beeck
et al., 2001). Nevertheless, Georgieva, Todd, Peeters, and
Orban (2008) found differences in the overall response
strength in human lateral occipital complex (LOC), with a
much stronger response to shaded objects, which raises
the possibility that the two types of stimuli are represented
Figure 2. Stimuli and
experimental design logic.
(A) Four stimulus classes
with all seven exemplars
in each class rendered
with the grassfire texture.
The last row shows the
silhouette versions of one
class. (B) Each participant
was presented with either
the first five (red box) or
the last five (green box)
exemplars from a class.
The assignment of stimulus
exemplars to stimulus
conditions (the positions
shown at the bottom) was done in such a way that stimulus exemplar 3 was the prototype (Position 3) for the red group, but an extreme
exemplar (Position 5) for the green group. Likewise, Stimulus 5 was the prototype (Position 3) for the green group but an extreme exemplar
(Position 5) for the red group.
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differently. We tested this by including this difference as a
between-subject factor, with one subject group tested with
silhouettes and the other group with shaded stimuli. This
between-subject manipulation had no effect on the re-
sponse strength in LOC, nor did it interact with the effects
of interest (see Results).
We checked that the one-dimensional parametric manip-
ulation also results in a one-dimensional physical change in
the actual images. We computed the pixel-wise differences
between all images in each object class (Op de Beeck et al.,
2001; Grill-Spector et al., 1999). For each pair of images,
we computed the difference in each pixel (maximal differ-
ence = 1), squared it, summed it across all pixels, took
the square root of this sum, and normalized the resulting
number by the square root of the number of pixels. The
resulting difference matrix is shown in Table 2A and illus-
trates several points. First, the differences between succes-
sive images are very constant, always at 0.32. Second, and
more in general, physical pixel-based differences conform
very closely to what one would expect on the basis of a
one-dimensional parametric variation with constant steps
(e.g., stimuli placed at coordinates 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4, on
the one dimension). In fact, the correlation between these
parametric differences and pixel-based differences was very
high, r = .94. Thus, the parametrically controlled shapes
result in a good control of physical pixel-based variability.
Stimulus presentation and response registration were
controlled by a laptop running the PsychToolbox (Brainard,
1997; Pelli, 1997) inMatlab (MathWorks,Natick,MA). Stimuli
were shown on a CRTmonitor during training (resolution=
1024 × 768 pixels, refresh rate = 60 Hz) and projected
into a mirror in front of the head during scanning by means
of a liquid crystal display projector (1280 × 1024 pixels;
Barco 6300; Barco, Kortrijk, Belgium). Stimuli, maximum
8 visual degrees in width/height, were presented around
the center of the screen with a random position offset from
the center of the screen of maximally 2 visual degrees.
Experimental Design
Tomanipulate prototypicality while controlling for physical
differences, we designed the experiment as follows (see
Figure 2B). The stimulus set included four object classes
with exemplars varying on one complex shape dimension
(Op de Beeck et al., 2001, 2003b) (Figure 2A). There were
seven stimuli in each class, but only five were shown to an
individual subject. So, we had five stimulus conditions per
subject, and the assignment of stimuli to stimulus condi-
tions was changed across subjects. Stimulus Condition 3
is the prototype and stimulus Conditions 1 and 5 the ex-
treme stimuli (Figure 2B). Specifically, per object class,
an individual subject was exposed to either Items 1–5 or
Items 3–7. Item 5 would be an extreme stimulus for a sub-
ject exposed to Items 1–5 (and the results associated with
this stimulus in this subject would fall in Condition 5),
whereas the same Item 5 would be a prototype for a sub-
ject exposed to Items 3–7 (and the results associated with
this stimulus in this subject would fall in Condition 3). In
contrast to the design followed by all previous studies of
norm-based encoding, this design assures that physical
stimulus differences or preexisting stimulus biases cannot
account for any differences in neural activity between the
different conditions.
In our study, the prototype is defined as being the aver-
age stimulus of the stimulus distribution shown to a subject
in the perceived stimulus space, which corresponds closely
to the central stimulus in the parametric space as well as in
the physical pixel-based stimulus space. This is often the
case in studies of norm-based coding, but some exceptions
exist, especially when the parametric space and perceived
space do not fully correspond (Kayaert, Biederman, Op de
Beeck, et al., 2005).
Behavioral Asymmetries during a Rating Task
To test for the development of biasing effects of the proto-
type, participants were asked to rate the similarity between
pairs of exemplars from the same class in a block of 25 trials
(all possible pairings of the five selected exemplars of a
class). Each training block could be initiated by the subject
and started with a preview of the five exemplars of a class,
each shown three times, one stimulus at a time, in a ran-
dom order (300msec stimulus presentation, 300msec ISI).
Next, subjects could start the 25 trials. In each trial, two
exemplars were shown sequentially (300 msec stimulus
duration, 300 msec ISI), and subjects had to rate the dis-
similarity between the two exemplars on a 7-point scale
(1 = same exemplar repeated, 7 = largest difference)
by typing in a number between 1 and 7 (Figure 3A). A small
red fixation dot was present continuously.
The first training session took place on Day 1, included
16 blocks (four repetitions of the four classes in the fixed
order and with the subject-specific group assignments),
and lasted half an hour. The second training session took
place on Day 2 and was an exact copy of the first session.
The third training session took place on Day 3, right before
scanning, and included four blocks (one repetition of each
class in the subject-specific order).
Scanning
General
Scanning was performed posttraining (Day 3) at the De-
partment of Radiology of the University Hospital in a 3-T
Philips Intera magnet with an eight-channel SENSE head
coil. The functional runs consisted of eight experimental
runs and two localizer runs. The data of one experimental
run of two subjects were removed because of excessive
headmotion (leaving 238 experimental runs). The localizer
runs were acquired after the experimental runs and were
followed by the acquisition of an anatomical scan.
For the experimental runs, functional images were ac-
quired with an ascending EPI sequence (160 time points
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per time series; repetition time = 2 sec, echo time =
30 msec, flip angle = 90°, voxel size = 2.75 × 2.75 mm,
36 slices, including most of the cortex except the frontal
cortex and most superior parts of the parietal cortex; slice
thickness = 3 mm and no interslice gap). The protocol was
slightly different for the localizer runs (105 time points per
time series; repetition time = 3 sec). A T1-weighted ana-
tomical image (resolution 1 × 1 × 1.2 mm) was acquired
at the end of each session.
Experimental Runs
Eight experimental runs were collected per subject (two
repetitions of the four classes in the fixed order and with
the subject-specific group assignments; see Experimental
design section). Each of the eight event-related experimen-
tal runs consisted of 160 trials. Each run started and ended
with five fixation trials and included 20 presentations of
each of the five exemplars of a class, 40 fixation trials,
and 10 catch trials (see below). Before each run, we pre-
sented the same preview as during training (each exemplar
presented three times in a random order).
Each trial lasted 2000 msec and contained one image.
This image was presented for 300 msec, followed by an
ISI of 1700 msec. A small red fixation dot was present
throughout the run (Figure 5A). The order of the seven
trial types (fixation, five exemplar positions, and catch) in
each run was determined a priori by generating eight or-
ders with preoptimized first-order counterbalancing with
optseq2 software (NMR Center; Massachusetts General
Hospital, Boston, MA). Per pair of participants, one re-
ceived these orders in ascending sequence (1 to 8) and
the other in descending sequence (8 to 1).
Subjects performed a luminance change detection task.
They were asked to press one button whenever they saw a
stimulus that was brighter than usual (catch trials). The stim-
ulus shape was chosen randomly from the five stimuli in
that block. The brightness difference between catch trials
and normal trials in the first run was high and therefore
the task easy. If detection performance was higher than
90% in a run, then the brightness difference was decreased
in the next run to keep the task interesting and nontrivial.
The catch trials were not included in the fMRI analysis.
Localizer Runs
The two localizer runs were used to define the object-
selective LOC and its subregions (lateral occipital [LO],
posterior fusiform [PFS]). Each localizer run consisted of
21 blocks and lasted 315 sec. In each block, we presented
20 images of the following: only a centrally presented fixa-
tion spot (five blocks per run), intact object images (eight
blocks; 20 gray-scale object images were used of, e.g.,
flower, guitar, and tomato), or Fourier phase-scrambled
versions of these object images (eight blocks). Each block
lasted 15 sec. Intact and scrambled object images were
presented in one of three colors (green, red, and blue).
Subjects performed a color-change detection task. They
were asked to press a button each time the stimuli changed
color. This occurred three times per block.
Analysis of Imaging Data
Data were analyzed using the Statistical Parametric Map-
ping software package (SPM5; Wellcome Department of
Figure 3. Behavioral training and data. (A) Trial structure during the similarity rating task. (B) Spatial configuration of the perceived similarities
averaged across the four shape spaces. This configuration is derived from the similarity ratings using metric MDS. The spacing between the
conditions is chosen to optimally reflect the rated difference. This configuration is very similar in dimensionality, stimulus order, and relative
stimulus differences to the position of the shapes in parametric space (as illustrated in Figure 2). (C) The difference (asymmetry) in the rated
similarity between trials with the same stimuli presented in a different order. For trials containing the prototype (Position 3), the rated similarity
was higher when the prototype was presented second compared with when it was presented first. For trials containing extremes (Position 1
or 5), the rated similarity was higher when the extreme was presented first compared with when it was presented second. Error bars represent
SEM across subjects.
Panis, Wagemans, and Op de Beeck 1833
Cognitive Neurology, London) as well as custom Matlab
code.
Preprocessing
Images were first corrected for differences in acquisition
time (slice timing; first slice as reference slice). They were
then realigned to correct for head movements. The func-
tional images of each subject were coregistered with his or
her anatomical image, segmented and spatially normalized
to a Montreal Neurological Institute template. During the
normalization, the functional images were resampled to
a voxel size of 3 × 3 × 3 mm. The localizer data were spa-
tially smoothed using a 6-mm FWHM kernel. For the ROI
analysis, no smoothing was applied to the data from the
experimental runs. For the whole-brain analysis, the func-
tional data were spatially smoothed using an 8-mm FWHM
kernel.
fMRI Data Analysis
LOC Analysis
For the localizer scans, the BOLD signal was modeled
using a boxcar response model smoothed with a hemo-
dynamic response function (Friston, 2003). The general
linear model contained two independent variables (intact
and scrambled) and six regressors (the translation and ro-
tation parameters from the realignment) for each of both
runs. Object-selective areas were defined as those areas in
the LO and ventral occipito-temporal cortex (PFS) with a
larger signal while subjects viewed intact objects versus
textures. The tmap corresponding to that contrast (thresh-
olded at an uncorrected p value of .000001) was overlaid on
the individualʼs coregistered anatomical image to select the
voxels in the areas of interest using custom Matlab code.
Figure 5B illustrates the LOC for one representative sub-
ject, including the subregions LO and PFS. The average
number of voxels in left LO, right LO, left PFS, and right
PFS was 883, 872, 535, and 585, respectively.
ROI Analysis
The time course of the BOLD signal intensity from the ex-
perimental runs was extracted by averaging the data from
all the voxels within the independently defined ROIs. We
averaged the signal intensity across the trials in each con-
dition from −4 to 16 sec post-trial onset (11 time points).
These event-related time courses of BOLD signal intensity
were then converted to percent signal change (PSC) by
subtracting the corresponding values for the fixation con-
dition and dividing by that value (see Figure 6A and B). We
then computed the peak for the time courses across con-
ditions for each subject (on average occurring 4 sec after
trial onset). The PSC at the peak served as the measured
response for each condition and was entered in a repeated
measures ANOVA (Figure 6C). For ease of comparison
with the behavioral data in Figure 3C, we also calculated
a normalized PSC by dividing each peak response by the
peak response for Position 3, for each subregion separately
(Figure 6D).
Whole-brain Analysis
The experimental design was optimized for an ROI ap-
proach in which the peak response at a specific time point
could be extracted, thus without any reliance on assump-
tions about hemodynamic response functions ( Jiang et al.,
2007; Yovel & Kanwisher, 2004; Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000,
2001). The design is less suited for whole-brain analyses
that rely on convolution with continuous response func-
tions, for which it would have been more optimal to add a
random offset to the timing of each trial. Nevertheless, we
performed a whole-brain analysis to verify that our ROI-
based analyses would not miss important effects in other
brain regions (note that superior parietal and frontal cor-
tex were not included in the imaged volume). For each
subject, we first performed a first-level whole-brain analysis
using an informed basis set and eight conditions (five posi-
tions, catch trials, fixation trials, and fixation at the start
and end) and six regressors (the translation and the rota-
tion parameters from the realignment) per experimental
run. Two contrasts were defined: objects versus fixation
trials and extremes (Positions 1 and 5) versus prototype
(Position 3). Next, second-level analyses were performed
to make inferences about these contrasts at the population
level.
RESULTS
Behavioral Evidence for a Norm-based Encoding
Several previous studies have proposed that asymmetries
in a successive stimulus comparison task can be used as
an index that some stimuli have a special status in the rep-
resentation of stimulus differences (Op de Beeck et al.,
2003a; Nosofsky, 1991). In each trial of the behavioral task,
subjects rated the difference of two exemplars from the
same class (Figure 3A). As shown in Table 1A, for each sub-
ject and position X (1 to 5) within each group, we first cal-
culated the average difference rating (across classes and
repetitions), once across those trials in which the exemplar
at condition X was the first stimulus (SR1) and once across
those trials in which the exemplar at position X was the
second stimulus (SR2; “same” trials with twice the same
stimulus were not used).
First, the difference in average rating was calculated
by subtracting SR1 from SR2 (Table 1, last column, or
Figure 3C). Figure 3C shows, on the basis of all 36 training
blocks per subject, that there was a reliable asymmetry
in ratings. For trials containing prototypical exemplars
(Condition 3), the average rated difference was higher
when the prototypical stimulus occupied the first position
compared with when it occupied the second position in a
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trial. For trials containing extremes (Condition 1 or 5), the
average difference was higher when these extremes occu-
pied the second position in a trial compared with the first
position. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a signifi-
cant difference in asymmetry between the five stimulus
conditions, F(4, 116) = 18.81, p < .0001. Planned com-
parisons showed a significant difference in asymmetry be-
tween stimulus Conditions 3 and 5, F(1, 29) = 36.12, p <
.0001, and between stimulus Condition 3 and both extreme
Conditions 1 and 5, F(1, 29) = 60.04, p < .0001.
Second, apart from the systematic pattern in terms of
asymmetry, there is also a clear difference in the mean dis-
similarity between the prototype Condition 3 and the ex-
treme Conditions 1 and 5, with a smaller rated difference
for the prototypes (Table 1A). This is a consequence of the
fact that for extreme conditions, there are some stimulus
conditions with a very large perceived difference, for ex-
ample between stimuli at Positions 1 and 5. If we restrict
the calculations of mean and asymmetry to the parametric
steps that are present for the prototype (so a maximum of
two steps), then the mean dissimilarity is about the same
across all conditions, but the asymmetry is still very large,
as shown in Table 1B.
Third, these asymmetries were present in each of the
three training sessions (Figure 4). Interestingly, the effect
size (approximately 0.4-unit difference between SR2 and
SR1 for Position 3 and the average SR2–SR1 of Positions 1
and 5) did not change across sessions.
Finally, we verified that there was a close resemblance
between the parametric and the physical shape manipula-
tions and perceived similarity (see also Methods section).
We constructed the perceived dissimilarity matrix as de-
rived from the behavioral ratings (Table 2B). The perceived
differences conform very closely to what one would ex-
pect on the basis of a one-dimensional parametric variation
with constant steps. In fact, the correlation between the
Table 1. Behavioral Data
Position SR2 SR1 Average (SR1 and SR2) SR2 − SR1
A
1 4.68 4.46 4.57 0.22
2 3.88 3.87 3.88 −0.10
3 3.42 3.63 3.53 −0.21
4 3.75 3.82 3.79 −0.07
5 4.64 4.48 4.56 0.16
B
1 3.52 3.23 3.37 0.28
2 3.25 3.29 3.27 −0.03
3 3.42 3.63 3.53 −0.21
4 3.23 3.23 3.23 0.00
5 3.44 3.25 3.35 0.19
Average dissimilarity values for each position (1 to 5) and stimulus order
(SR1 and SR2). (A) All trials. (B) Trials with two steps or less between
both stimuli (no trials with stimuli occupying Positions 1 and 5, 1 and
4, or 2 and 5).
Figure 4. Behavioral asymmetries for separate sessions. Conventions are the same as in Figure 3C.
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parametric differences and the perceived dissimilarity was
very high (r = .99). Thus, the parametrically controlled
shapes result in a good control of perceptual variability.
This conclusion is confirmed by the application of metric
multidimensional scaling (MDS) to the matrix with per-
ceived dissimilarities (after making this matrix symmetric).
MDS results in a low-dimensional spatial configuration of
the five conditions in which the distance is as close as pos-
sible to the dissimilarity for each pair of conditions. A one-
dimensional MDS solution explained 99% of the variance in
the dissimilarity matrix and is very similar to what we would
expect given the parametric shapemanipulations. This spa-
tial configuration is shown in Figure 3B. We can therefore
be sure that the perceived average stimulus lies close to
Position 3 and far from Positions 1 and 5.
In sum, we obtained behavioral evidence that a biasing
effect from the perceived average stimulus has emerged
from the first day in which the stimuli were viewed.
Neuroimaging Evidence for a
Norm-based Encoding
To check the neural representation of the within-class
stimulus distribution, we scanned the same subjects in an
event-related fMRI experiment performed after the behav-
ioral rating sessions (Figure 5A). Previous studies have
indicated that objects are represented by neural activity
in a large region in LO and ventral occipito-temporal cor-
tex, referred to as the LOC (Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004;
Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000; Malach et al., 1995). LOC is a
Figure 5. Main features of
the design and main ROIs
in the fMRI experiment.
(A) Illustration of the sequence
and timing of trials and images
during part of a scan run.
(B) The location of both
subdivisions of LOC (LO and
PFS) in one representative
subject. The t map represents
the contrast [intact object
images–scrambled images]
for one subject, thresholded
at p < 10−6 and shown on top
of the PALS human atlas (top:
lateral view; bottom: ventral
view) using CARET software
(Van Essen et al., 2001).
Table 2. Dissimilarity Matrices
A B
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 0 0.32 0.45 0.55 0.63 1.58 2.43 4.04 5.31 6.04
2 0.32 0 0.32 0.45 0.55 2.58 1.65 2.88 4.40 5.64
3 0.45 0.32 0 0.32 0.45 4.45 2.91 1.68 2.79 4.37
4 0.55 0.45 0.32 0 0.32 5.60 4.41 2.74 1.65 2.52
5 0.63 0.55 0.45 0.32 0 6.08 5.36 4.02 2.49 1.57
Rows represent SR1 (1 to 5) and columns SR2 (1 to 5) in a trial. (A) Pixel-wise differences averaged across the four actual stimulus spaces shown in
Figure 2 in the same way as for the fMRI analyses, so for a subset of five images of all seven images in a space. Similar results were obtained with all
images. (B) Perceived dissimilarity matrix from the similarity ratings (1 = same, 7 = maximally different) averaged across the four classes.
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large brain region, andprevious studies have suggested that
it might be composed of two subregions (Grill-Spector,
2003; Grill-Spector et al., 1999): the LO gyrus (area LO)
and the posterior fusiform region (area PFS). Area LO is
generally thought of as being at a lower level in the object
processing hierarchy compared with area PFS, giving us
the opportunity to investigate how widespread the norm-
based encoding is across the object vision pathway. We
defined LO and PFS in each individual subject from their
typical preference for intact object images over scrambled
images (Figure 5B). We extracted the event-related fMRI re-
sponse for each stimulus position in LO and PFS (Figure 6A
and B), and we defined response strength at the peak of
this event-related response (Figure 6C).
If visual experience can determine which stimulus is
encoded as the prototype and which as an extreme class
example, then we expect a lower neural population re-
sponse for the prototype than for the extreme stimuli,
although the attribution of physical stimuli to conditions
was counterbalanced and reversed across subjects. A re-
peated measures ANOVA with factors Subregion (LO and
PFS), Stimulus Rendering (two-dimensional silhouette or
three-dimensional grassfire), and Position (1 to 5) on the
peak responses (Figure 6C) showed significant main ef-
fects of Subregion, F(1, 28) = 20.23, p < .001, and Posi-
tion, F(4, 112) = 3.16, p = .0167. The main effect of
Stimulus Rendering was not significant, F(1, 28) = 0.85,
p = .365, and this factor did not interact with other ef-
fects. There was a significant interaction between Sub-
region and Position, F(4, 112) = 2.99, p = .0219. Thus,
the variation in response strength across stimulus posi-
tions interacted significantly with ROI. Most importantly,
the peak response (Figure 6C) was significantly lower
for the prototype compared with the average of the
two extreme conditions in area PFS, F(1, 28) = 12.12,
p = .0017, but not in area LO, F(1, 28) = 1.60, p = .217.
When comparing the response to extreme Position 5 with
that to the prototype (so with stimuli perfectly counter-
balanced across subjects), a significant difference is pres-
ent in PFS, F(1, 28) = 8.91, p = .0058, but not in LO, F(1,
28) = 2.53, p= .123. The response to extreme Position 1 is
also larger than that to the prototype in PFS, F(1, 28) =
7.913 p = .0088, but not in LO, F(1, 28) = 0.23, p = .64.
Further division of PFS according to left versus right hemi-
sphere revealed a significant difference between the proto-
type and the average response to the extremes in each
Figure 6. Effect of stimulus position in object-selective cortex. (A) PSC compared with the fixation baseline as a function of Position in LO.
(B) PSC for each Position in PFS. (C) Peak responses as a function of ROI and Position. (D) Normalized PSC as a function of ROI and Position.
Error bars represent SEM across subjects.
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hemisphere (left PFS, p = .004; right PFS, p = .003). Also,
the prototype effect in PFS tended to be graded instead of
all or none, with stimuli at intermediate positions eliciting
an intermediate response: The response to the prototype
was also significantly smaller than the average response to
the intermediate stimuli at Positions 2 and 4 ( p = .03),
and the response to Positions 2 and 4 tended to be smaller
than the response to extremes (Positions 1 and 5, p= .088).
For ease of comparison with the behavioral data in Fig-
ure 3C and the previous report of norm-based encoding
for faces in the monkey brain (Figure 4A in Leopold et al.,
2006), we normalized these peak responses by dividing
each by the average peak response for Position 3, sepa-
rately for each subregion (Figure 6D). This representation
reveals a similar U-shaped function centered around the
prototype as found in Figure 3C, again only for area PFS.
A repeated measures ANOVA on these normalized PSCs
showed a significant main effect of Position, F(4, 112) =
3.39, p = .0118, and again only a significant interaction
between Position and Subregion, F(4, 112) = 4.133, p =
.0037. There were no main effects of Subregion, F(1,
28) = 1.68, p = .21, nor Stimulus Rendering, F(1, 28) =
0.75, p = .39. Planned comparisons showed the same sig-
nificant differences as above, such as a lower normalized
response to the prototype (Position 3) compared with the
average response to the extremes (Positions 1 and 5) in
area PFS, F(1, 28) = 12.12, p = .0017, but not in area
LO, F(1, 28) = 1.60, p = .217.
These results indicate that a norm-based encoding is
strongly modulated specifically in a higher level region
of the object vision pathway after visual experience with
the distribution of exemplars. This visual experience al-
lows the representations to be centered or “anchored”
on the prototype or norm. The effect size is relatively small,
with the response being approximately 16% larger to ex-
tremes than to prototypes, but previous monkey single-
cell studies with faces (Freiwald, Tsao, & Livingstone,
2009) and novel shapes (Kayaert, Biederman, Op de Beeck,
et al., 2005) have also found effect sizes close to 20%.
We also performed a whole-brain second-level analysis
to find out whether other brain regions outside LOC
would also show this effect. Of course, a second-level
analysis for the contrast “objects versus fixation” showed
significant activity throughout the ventral object vision
pathway, including the typical anatomical location of ret-
inotopic areas V1–V4 and LO and fusiform gyrus ( p <
.001 corrected). However, when comparing the average
response to the extremes with that to the prototype, the
contrast “extremes versus prototype” showed no voxels
surviving the threshold ( p < .05 corrected). At an uncor-
rected threshold of .05, there were one cluster of active
voxels in the right fusiform gyrus and one in lateral pos-
terior parietal cortex bilaterally but more extensive in the
right hemisphere. Clear event-related responses were
observed in these two second-level ROIs as shown in Fig-
ure 7. Prefrontal and superior parietal and frontal cortices
were not covered during scanning.
Further analyses on the defined PFS ROI suggested
that this apparent lateralization in the whole-brain analy-
sis (only activity in the right hemisphere), which was not
found in the ROI analysis, was due to more overlap be-
tween subjects in the anatomical location of PFS in the
right hemisphere compared with the left hemisphere.
For each ROI and subject separately, we calculated the
number of voxels that matched the same ROI in each
of the 29 other subjects separately. Second, we calculated
the average of these 29 numbers for each subject and
ROI. A paired t test across subjects showed that on aver-
age, the number of matching voxels across subjects is
higher in right PFS (n = 193) compared with left PFS
(n = 170), t(29) = 2.37, p = .0247. Thus, the apparent
lateralization in the whole-brain analysis is probably due
Figure 7. Second-level ROIs analysis. (A) PSC compared with the fixation baseline as a function of Position in the right posterior fusiform (RPFS)
ROI identified by the second-level analysis (uncorrected p < .05). (B) PSC in the bilateral parietal (PAR) ROI identified in the same second-level
analysis.
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to between-subject variation in functional anatomy, which
does not affect ROI analyses with ROIs defined in indi-
vidual subjects.
Finally, we investigated whether the lower popula-
tion response for prototypes can be explained by short-
term adaptation (Grill-Spector & Malach, 2001; Kourtzi &
Kanwisher, 2000), as has been suggested by N. Davidenko,
D. Remus, and K. Grill-Spector (Society for Neuroscience
Abstracts, 19.5, 2008) for the case of a block design. Short-
term adaptation refers to a phenomenon in which the
response to a stimulus depends on the preceding stim-
ulus. The effect is modulated by the similarity between
stimuli (more adaptation with higher similarity; Panis,
Vangeneugden, Op de Beeck, & Wagemans, 2008), and it
declines as a function of the time interval between adapter
and test stimulus. Short-term adaptation between suc-
cessive trials might indeed explain part of the lower re-
sponses for prototypical images found in the literature.
Inour event-related study, the exact stimuli precedingeach
condition (one-back, i.e., the previous trial) were equated
to allow an unbiased measure of the response in each
condition. As a consequence, however, on average the
prototype will be more similar to its preceding stimulus
than an extreme will be just because an extreme stimulus
might sometimes be preceded by a very different stim-
ulus (the other extreme). We designed the experiment
to avoid short-term adaptation as much as possible, more
than most of the studies in the literature: We used an
event-related design, each stimulus was only presented
shortly, and there was a 1700-msec interval between suc-
cessive images. Nevertheless, short-term adaptation can-
not simply be excluded as a possibility.
We performed an explicit test of the presence of short-
term adaptation between successive trials. A finer division
of conditions on the basis of what occurred in the pre-
vious trial is not an acceptable approach for most condi-
tions, given that this procedure would typically mess up
the careful one-back randomization of the preceding stim-
ulus referred to earlier. However, a powerful test is avail-
able from trials with extreme stimuli after extreme stimuli
(Figure 8). In some cases (“same extreme” or SE), an ex-
treme stimulus will succeed itself, resulting in maximal
adaptation. In other cases (“different extreme” or DE),
an extreme stimulus will succeed the other extreme stimu-
lus, resulting in the maximal release of adaptation achiev-
able in our design. Importantly, these two trial types are
perfectly counterbalanced with regard to the physical stim-
uli. No significant difference could be detected between SE
and DE in PFS (two-tailed paired t test), t(29) = −.30, p =
.77, nor in LO (two-tailed paired t test), t(29) = −.11, p =
.91, arguing against adaptation between successive trials
in this experiment (a similar test with the same outcome
was performed by Freiwald et al., 2009).
This lack of trial-to-trial adaptation stands in contrast to
how these two “extreme-after-extreme” conditions com-
pare with a third condition in which a prototype was pre-
ceded by an extreme stimulus (condition EP; this is a
small subset of the trials in Condition 3 in the main anal-
yses). So here the preceding stimulus is counterbalanced
(always extreme), and the current stimulus is a proto-
type. As expected and consistent with the ROI analysis
results, the response was lower in condition EP com-
pared with the average of SE and DE in PFS (one-tailed
paired t test), t(29) = −1.85, p = .0376, but not in LO
(one-tailed paired t test), t(29) = −.689, p = .248.
DISCUSSION
The present study provides the first experimental evidence
that empirical effects typically associated with norm-based
encoding can be strongly modulated, even reversed among
stimuli, after learning at a time scale that is longer than
single successive trials but far shorter than the weeks of
testing involved in previous neurophysiological studies of
norm-based encoding with faces.
We found behavioral and neural evidence for a norm-
based encoding scheme with novel object classes, which
was restricted to a higher level region of the ventral visual
system in the fusiform gyrus. We can conclude that this re-
sult is a result of visual experience with the distribution of
exemplars from the object classes and not of preexisting
stimulus biases because the critical difference between
our design and previous studies of norm-referenced cod-
ing with faces and objects is that we changed the stim-
ulus distribution between subjects, which allowed us to
dissociate between the actual stimuli and the prototypical-
ity status of a stimulus in the experienced distribution of
stimuli.
Also in contrast to all previous fMRI studies on this topic,
we used an event-related design with one image per trial
and minimized trial-to-trial adaptation by having a rela-
tively long time interval between successive images. Given
Figure 8. Test of trial-to-trial adaptation. The response is shown for
three conditions: extreme stimulus after the same extreme stimulus
(Position 1 after 1 or 5 after 5), extreme stimulus after the other
extreme stimulus (Position 1 after 5 or 5 after 1), and prototype
stimulus (Position 3) after extreme stimulus (1 or 5). Error bars
represent SEM across subjects.
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that we also verified empirically that no adaptation oc-
curred specifically between successive images, we can con-
clude that the evidence for norm-based encoding relates
to a more long-term effect that integrates across multiple
trials.
Apart from revealing the role of visual experience for
norm-based encoding, our findings show that this encod-
ing scheme is limited within the ventral visual pathway to
the part of object-selective cortex around the fusiform
gyrus. No norm-based encoding was found in the LO
gyrus. The latter region is typically considered as lower
in the hierarchy of visual processing levels, and it has more
sensitivity for low-level features such as retinal stimulus po-
sition (Sayres & Grill-Spector, 2008; Hemond, Kanwisher,
& Op de Beeck, 2007). Nevertheless, it also codes for high-
level aspects of stimuli that are represented in the fusiform
region, including object shape (Haushofer, Livingstone,
& Kanwisher, 2008; Op de Beeck et al., 2008; Kourtzi &
Kanwisher, 2000). Thus, area LO appears to encode the
shape features of both novel and more familiar objects
without any reference to the class prototype. Note that
norm-based encoding (see Figure 1) is a different type of
representation than the so-called prototype-based models
in the category learning literature (e.g., Ashby & Maddox,
1993). In fact, norm-based encoding integrates exemplar-
based and prototype-based models because single neu-
rons are tuned for class exemplars (Freiwald et al., 2009;
Leopold et al., 2006; Kayaert, Biederman, Op de Beeck,
et al., 2005), but there is an unequal distribution of the
exemplars preferred by single neurons, as most neurons
will prefer an extreme exemplar (Leopold et al., 2006).
The changes underlying norm-based encoding occur at
a time scale that is similar to the time scale underlying
other behavioral and neural phenomena such as long-term
priming (Grill-Spector, 2001), which works across minutes
and hours (Vuilleumier, Henson, Driver, & Dolan, 2002;
Wiggs & Martin, 1998). Our behavioral data suggest that
norm-based encoding does not need multiple days to
develop, given that the behavioral asymmetry effect was
already found in the first 10 minutes or 100 trials (i.e., after
the first four blocks of the first behavioral session, see Fig-
ure 4). We performed the fMRI sessions after multiple
training sessions, but the positive result that we obtained
in area PFS might not take multiple days to develop, and it
might be working over tens of seconds or minutes. Thus,
our experiment shows that visual experience can influence
which stimulus is processed as the prototype and that this
effect is building up across intervening trials, but it does
not answer all questions about the exact time scale (min-
utes, hours, or days) over which these experience-related
dynamics occur—further experiments will need to address
this issue.
Interestingly, the parietal cortex—classically related with
attentional processing (for reviews, seeCorbetta&Shulman,
2002; Kanwisher & Wojciulik, 2000)—also tended to re-
spond stronger to extreme compared with prototypical ex-
emplars (Figure 7B). Although this result was not strongly
significant in a statistical sense, it is consistent with the
idea that norm-based encoding has attentional advantages
(Barlow, 1990), possibly by influencing the saliency of
stimuli in a top–down fashion (see Corbetta & Shulman,
2002). If correct, we would predict that extreme exem-
plars pop out from a field of prototypical exemplars in a vi-
sual search task (preliminary evidence for this has been
obtained by Kayaert, Panis, Op de Beeck, & Wagemans,
2009).
In our study, the prototype was conceptualized as the
average. This is a common procedure, also widely applied
in the studies on norm-based encoding with faces. Further-
more, it is also the classic way to define prototypes in the
extended literature on prototype-based category learning
(Smith & Minda, 1998; Posner & Keele, 1968). In most
of these cases, as in our experiment, prototypicality is dis-
sociated from raw frequency because the latter is either
the same for prototypes and nonprototypes (as in our
experiment) or even smaller for prototypes (e.g., in the
classic prototype learning experiments the prototype is
never shown during training and has to be “abstracted”).
In everyday situations, raw frequency might be correlated
with prototypicality and/or prototypicality might be disso-
ciated from the average.
On a related note, stimuli might acquire a “special” sta-
tus in the representation of other stimuli for other rea-
sons than being a prototype (Nosofsky, 1991). First of all,
it is not entirely clear which is the “special” stimulus on the
basis of the neural data: Is it the stimulus associated with
the smallest response or the one associated with the larg-
est response? Studies on norm-based encoding interpret
the smaller response for the “average” stimulus as evi-
dence that this stimulus is the anchor used to compare
all other stimuli with. However, all our data are showing
is that stimuli get a different status in the mental space
of category exemplars for representing the stimuli, and
by itself, this does not prove which stimulus is the most
important one. According to the adaptive coding model
of Rhodes and Jeffery (2006) shown in Figure 1, however,
the question of which stimulus is most important is not
a good one because it refers to two sides of the same coin:
Although neurons stay tuned to the (low or high) extreme
values encountered in the natural world, they adapt to
prevalent (average) values. Stimuli with average values
on dimensions used to discriminate stimuli are only coded
implicitly by equal activation of two neural populations,
one adapted to respond strongest to above-average values
and the other one to below-average values. As a result,
neurons fire strongest to extreme stimuli, but stimuli with
average values on many dimensions used to discriminate
exemplars (i.e., stimuli close to the prototype) are repre-
sented with the lowest overall activity and are processed
most efficiently. The prototype changes dynamically de-
pending on the frequency with which exemplars are en-
countered, the identity of the exemplars experienced, the
task factors, and so forth. Such dynamic changes are re-
vealed at the neural level in our experiment.
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Furthermore, we leave open the possibility that other
factors besides the prototypicality of a stimulus might
contribute to its function as an anchor. Some of these
factors might not be related to the bottom–up statistics
of the visual input. For example, a system might learn
that specific stimuli are particularly important through
feedback learning, and in this case these stimuli might
function as anchors. A more general term that is appropri-
ate for all these cases would be “anchor” instead of norm/
prototype. Thus, using a more general terminology, we
have revealed that visual experience with novel exemplars
can cause some stimuli to get a special status as an anchor
in the encoding of the differences between exemplars of a
particular class. These flexible and experience-based an-
choring mechanisms might be a universal type of repre-
sentation in the brain, in vision and beyond (Chapman
& Johnson, 2002; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988; Couclelis,
Golledge, Gale, & Tobler, 1987).
Given the importance of the concept of norm-based
encoding, we anticipate the presented findings to be a
starting point for future studies looking into the role of
several other variables for how this encoding scheme is
affected by visual experience. One potentially important
factor is the behavioral state of the subjects. In our ex-
periments, subjects attended to the shape differences dur-
ing the behavioral rating sessions. Several aspects of this
training task might matter. First, subjects are trained in
this discrimination rating task, providing the opportunity
to refine perceptual representations. Second, the training
task might make the shape differences more salient to
subjects. Third, the “average” rating in trials including a
prototype was lower than the rating in trials including
extreme stimuli (see Table 1A, columns 2 and 3). So, on
average, the extremes and the prototype are not asso-
ciated with the same behavioral response during training.
The same phenomenon actually occurs with familiar ob-
jects, for example, more average faces are rated as more
attractive (Rhodes, 2006), and social reactions differ as a
function of attractiveness.
During scanning, the task was very different: Subjects
were required to press a button every time an object was
brighter than the other objects, and shape differences
were no longer relevant (these catch trials were excluded
from the analyses). The strength of the norm-based encod-
ing might of course depend on the relevance of shape dif-
ferences before and/or during scanning (see, e.g., Gillebert,
Op de Beeck, Panis, & Wagemans, 2009). Note that stud-
ies showing norm-based encoding (which did not take
into account a possible role of within-experiment experi-
ence) have also mostly ignored the relevance of task con-
text, for example, the two monkeys in the study of Leopold
et al. (2006) were very different in this respect. More
studies are needed to pinpoint the role of task context
for norm-based encoding.
In conclusion, we found behavioral and neural evi-
dence for a norm-based encoding scheme with novel ob-
ject classes, which was restricted to a higher level region
of the ventral visual system in the fusiform gyrus. Thanks
to the careful counterbalancing of physical stimulus prop-
erties across conditions, we can conclude that this find-
ing is a result of visual experience with the distribution of
exemplars from the object classes. Thus, not all exem-
plars of novel object classes are treated equally for the
representation of within-class object differences. The dis-
tribution of exemplars can cause some stimuli to get a
special status as an anchor in the encoding of the differ-
ences between exemplars of a particular class.
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